Negotiating over payments for wetland ecosystem services
研究了第三方（如政府）参与下，结合补贴的湿地生态系统服务支付方案的经济效率，比较了不同监管框架的效果，发现第三方在交易成本存在时对两种方案无偏好，但受益者和提供者可能有冲突。
Abstract This paper proposes and examines the economic efficiency of novel payment schemes for the provision of wetland ecosystem services. By definition, payments for ecosystem services typically involve voluntary transactions between the beneficiaries and providers of ecosystem services. We develop a theoretical model that addresses the role that a third party—such as a social planner or government agency, acting in the interest of society—can play to ensure the optimal provision of ecosystem services. We consider different regulatory frameworks combining payments for ecosystem services with a subsidy that the third party grants to the beneficiaries or providers of ecosystem services. We compare the outcomes of the different policy mixes characterized by different levels of involvement of the third party. Of particular interest is the comparison between the outcomes of payments for ecosystem services subsidy arrangements in which the third party plays decentralized and centralized roles. Our results show, among other things, that the third party is indifferent between a negotiated payment for ecosystem services combined with a subsidy scheme and the constrained first‐best payments for ecosystem services subsidy scheme, in the presence of transaction and administrative costs. However, beneficiaries and providers may have conflicting preferences over the two payments for ecosystem services schemes.