产权不安全与住房市场:解释印度的住房空置悖论

Insecure property rights and the housing market: Explaining India’s housing vacancy paradox

Journal of Urban Economics · 2022
被引 22
人大 AABS 3

中文导读

研究发现印度因租金管制和合同执行不力导致的产权不安全提高了住房空置率,通过面板数据分析,放松租金管制可降低空置率2.8至3.1个百分点,并减少住房短缺7.5%。

Abstract

One housing paradox in many markets is the simultaneous presence of high costs and high vacancy rates. India has expensive housing relative to incomes and an urban housing vacancy rate of 12.4%. We show how insecure property rights in India, as a result of rent control and weak contract enforcement, increases vacancy rates. Using a two-way linear fixed effects panel regression, we exploit changes in rent control laws in the states of West Bengal, Karnataka, Gujarat, and Maharashtra to find that pro-tenant laws are positively related to vacancy rates. A pro-landlord policy change liberalizing rent adjustments could potentially reduce vacancy rates by 2.8 to 3.1 percentage points. Contract enforcement measured by density of judges is negatively related to vacancy. We estimate that a policy change in rent control laws would have a net welfare benefit and could reduce India's housing shortage by 7.5%.

产权安全性住房空置率租金管制合同执行