Political Competition and State Capacity: Evidence from a Land Allocation Program in Mexico
研究执政党在面临政治竞争时，如何因在庇护主义而非公共品供给上具有比较优势，而倾向于抑制国家能力投资，并利用墨西哥1960年代初的全国性冲击提供实证证据。
Abstract We develop a model of the politics of state capacity building undertaken by incumbent parties that have a comparative advantage in clientelism rather than in public goods provision. The model predicts that, when challenged by opponents, clientelistic incumbents have the incentive to prevent investments in state capacity. We provide empirical support for the model’s implications by studying policy decisions by the Institutional Revolutionary Party that affected local state capacity across Mexican municipalities and over time. Our difference-in-differences and instrumental variable identification strategies exploit a national shock that threatened the Mexican government’s hegemony in the early 1960s.