工资公告如何影响求职:一项实地实验

How Wage Announcements Affect Job Search— A Field Experiment

American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics · 2022
被引 39
人大 AABS 4

中文导读

通过随机分配工资给相似职位空缺,发现高工资吸引更多求职者,但仍有不少人只申请低工资职位;补充调查显示高工资职位被认为竞争更激烈,支持定向/竞争性搜索理论的核心预测。

Abstract

In a field experiment, we study how job seekers respond to posted wages by assigning wages randomly to pairs of otherwise similar vacancies in a large number of professions. Higher wages attract significantly more interest. Still, a nontrivial number of applicants only reveal an interest in the low-wage vacancy. With a complementary survey, we show that external raters perceive higher-wage jobs as more competitive. These findings qualitatively support core predictions of theories of directed/competitive search, though in the simplest calibrated model, applications react too strongly to the wage. We discuss extensions such as on-the-job search that rectify this.

工资公告求职行为定向搜索现场实验