Battered by Geopolitical Winds, Bulgaria Struggles to Restart Much Needed Reforms
本文分析了2021-2022年保加利亚在三次议会选举和俄乌战争冲击下，国内改革派与既得利益集团、亲欧与亲俄势力的复杂博弈，以及欧盟在支持改革与推动北马其顿入盟谈判之间的两难困境。
In 2021, Bulgaria went through a turbulent political year, followed by an even more turbulent first half of 2022. In the domestic arena, divisions between established parties serving rent seeking elites (Dimitrova, 2018) and newer movements challenging the state capture model in Bulgarian politics became clearly visible in the course of a year that contained three parliamentary elections and a presidential one. In the arena of EU policy making, various European Union (EU) actors, including Commissioner for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Varhelyi, German Chancellor Scholtz, French President Macron and diplomats working as part of the French Presidency of the Council of Ministers have been working on a compromise proposal opening the way for lifting Bulgaria's veto on the start of accession negotiations with North Macedonia. Domestically, however, some political actors have attempted – and partly succeeded – to politicize relations with neighbouring North Macedonia and to mobilize public opinion against a compromise. The complexity on the domestic and European fronts that challenged pro-reform political leaders trying to re-start reforms and restore the eroded institutions of governance increased further with the Russian invasion of Ukraine. While Bulgaria was not the only European country battered by the harsh geopolitical winds, the Russian invasion of Ukraine exposed the extensive penetration of Russian influence in Bulgaria and laid bare Russia's destabilizing influence on societal debates and democratic political processes. This contribution provides an overview of these developments and argues that the opening for reform of institutions of governance created by the rise of reformist parties, such as Democratic Bulgaria and ‘We Continue the Change’ has been, in contrast to the past, endangered, rather than reinforced by interactions in the European arena. There are two trends to be observed. On the one hand, in the domestic arena, a significant cleavage has become visible between pro-reform and status quo parties. Specifically, in 2021 pro-reform parties became a force to be reckoned with, while at the same time under a banner of change and with anti-corruption rhetoric populist movements also arose ultimately serving to protect the status quo. The most important domestic cleavage thus became one separating those committed to govern based on universalist principles and the rule of law and those engaged in ‘competitive particularism’ (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2015, p.31–2). 1 On the other hand, domestic politicization of the choices to be made at the EU level in the context of enlargement policy and Russian influence after the start of the Russian invasion in Ukraine have delineated a cleavage between nationalist and pro-Russian politicians on the one hand and Euro-Atlantic ones, on the other. Crucially, these two cleavages do not overlap, as they have usually done in Bulgarian history, as some pro-European parties are engaged in informal and populist politics and aim to preserve corrupt practices and institutions. This article argues therefore, that the EU and Bulgaria have been presented with a dilemma which is more complex than ever. For the EU, the choice between supporting a new government committed to far-reaching reforms of the kind the EU has been calling for since Bulgaria's accession – enhancing rule of law and limiting corruption – and applying pressure to facilitate the start of negotiations with North Macedonia, important for reasons of fairness, policy coherence and credibility, has been a stark one. While the French presidency of the Council of the EU brokered a compromise that made it possible to unblock the deadlock on North Macedonia (Bechev, 2022b), the mismatch between domestic and foreign policy cleavages in Bulgarian politics will likely continue to cause problems. The article will proceed as follows. After sketching the context of Bulgaria's path to the European Union, the first section discusses stagnation and backsliding that characterized the end of a decade of GERB (Grazhdani za Evropejsko Razvitie na Bulgaria: Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria) rule. The section outlines domestic political trends and developments that led to mass protests targeting corruption and problems with the rule of law in 2020–21. Subsequently, the dynamics of emerging protest parties and movements in 2021, when elections took place three times, will be explained with an emphasis on sources of electoral volatility. The article then turns to the first six months of 2021 to follow the six months of a reformist government formation and the challenges that brought its quick demise, to arrive at a first analysis of the mismatch between domestic cleavages and geopolitical developments that create the tensions and dangers for Bulgarian democracy. Bulgaria, along with Romania, has been labelled an EU laggard since accession (Dimitrov and Plachkova, 2021; Dimitrova, 2020). In the early 2000s, during the final stages of Eastern enlargement, concerns about rule of law, especially the accountability of certain parts of the judiciary and prosecution, state capture and the role of organized crime led the EU to postpone Bulgaria's (and Romania's) accession to 2007. Bulgaria's Accession Treaty included additional suspension clauses, in addition to the safeguards introduced by the EU for the 2004 accession group (Noutcheva and Bechev, 2008). Post-accession, the EU created a monitoring mechanism for both Bulgaria and Romania, the so-called Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) that involved regular reports from the European Commission focusing on areas of persistent concern such as the rule of law. This mechanism, however, resulted in no great success in improving the rule of law (Dimitrov and Plachkova 2021; Dimitrov et al., 2014, Gateva, 2013). The main reason was that institutional adjustments remained formal and piecemeal, while underlying, informal relations structured politics along patron-client lines (Dimitrova, 2018; Mungiu-Pippidi, 2015) and undermined the ability of the institutions of governance – the judiciary and regulators - to fulfil their functions. Yet in the last decade, the escalating conflict over the rule of law and democracy in Hungary and Poland and the EU's inability to address backsliding in these member states (Kelemen, 2020), made unreformed Bulgaria look good, or at least not as bad, to the EU. Successive Bulgarian governments under Boyko Borissov and his GERB party did not engage in very visible moves to undermine democratic institutions, replace judges or ban media outlets. At the EU level, GERB and Borissov had a reputation of following Germany's lead in the Council and aligning with European People's Party (EPP) in the European Parliament. These alliances and the use of emphatically pro-European rhetoric have served to mask the shortcomings of Bulgarian democracy. Bulgaria's long-standing Prime Minister, Boyko Borissov, was careful not to engage in anti-European rhetoric, in contrast to Viktor Orban in Hungary. In crucial votes, such as the 2015 vote on the ill-fated Commission plan for redistribution of asylum seekers and subsequent Council decision taken by qualified majority, 2 Bulgaria voted for the decision and did not join the Visegrad group in their dissent. Bulgaria's 2018 presidency of the Council of Ministers was reasonably successful and managed to make some progress in key dossiers, including enlargement with the Western Balkans (Veleva-Eftimova and Haralampiev, 2022). Despite compliance and a seemingly smooth record in the EU, the state of Bulgarian democracy until recently could be described as stagnation disguised as stability. Under the almost uninterrupted dominance of GERB and its leader Boyko Borissov since 2009 (except for a brief Socialist party led coalition in 2013–14), a barely discernible transformation unfolded over three successive cabinets, leading to a more pronounced trend of democratic backsliding in 2018–19. Backsliding set in with several key features: a more overt and visible fusion of business and politics led by, but not limited to the DPS (Dvizhenie za Prava I Svobodi – Movement for Rights and Freedoms) and GERB, increasing dominance of personalized politics around the figure of Borissov, and politicized prosecution. Ultimately, a serious erosion of democratic institutions occurred from the first to the third Borissov cabinets. Initially, his government incorporated some political and expert heavyweights and respected democratic checks and balances, but by the end of the third GERB coalition government it combined executive aggrandisement and nationalist discourses with informal, but powerful influences from dubious figures sanctioned by the US, such as member of parliament and media tycoon Peevski. The outline of a harder authoritarian trend in Bulgarian politics became visible in 2019 through developments such as the strengthening of the Office of the Prosecutor in Chief and the creation of specialized prosecution and courts. The Prosecutor in Chief, Ivan Geshev, had been appointed in October 2019, despite his candidacy attracting serious concerns over politicized prosecution and leading to protests (Gotev, 2019). Indeed, under Geshev the Prosecutor's office soon engaged in politically motivated and unfounded prosecutions against inconvenient politicians and public figures such as the case against former ministers Simeon Dyankov and Traicho Traikov and newspaper owner Ivo Prokopiev in 2020. Ultimately, the case was dismissed with the judge stressing that normal political and advisory activities were presented as criminal by the prosecution. Prokopiev, for example, was accused of expressing an opinion in his capacity of a member of a national advisory council body, while Traikov and Dyankov acted in professional capacity and competent manner (Mitov, 2020a, 2020b). These authoritarian trends, enabled by GERB's decade long dominance on the political stage, were challenged by mass protests that started in the summer of 2020 and continued until April 2021. The initial impulse for the protests was provided by the leader of the right centre party ‘Da, Bulgaria’ Hristo Ivanov in an action that brilliantly illustrated the problem of state capture. Ivanov attempted to land with a boat on a beach near the Bulgarian Black Sea port of Burgas where Ahmed Dogan, the former Party chairman of DPS (representing the Bulgarian Turkish minority) had built a private port and summer residence and taken over parts of the coast. Despite the constitutional provision that beaches are public property, Ivanov and his companion were stopped by Dogan's bodyguards. Transmitted live via social media, Ivanov's failed attempt to plant the Bulgarian flag on the guarded beach near Dogan's compound attracted attention and caused indignation. ‘Da Bulgaria’ and other political figures, notably the President Rumen Radev, condemned the actions of the security guards, especially as it became clear that they were by a state the for despite the that was not an a of a specialized of the Prosecutor's office the Presidency in for his was that led to and of were to the of the government and the Prosecutor in of stagnation followed by backsliding and mass 2021 became a year in Bulgarian to the for no than three parliamentary the presidential in 2021. Bulgarian politics a in on the one hand change and change and and on the of political and of with presented serious to both political and the impulse for reforms by The parliamentary elections in and 2021 became a of and new in the political arena with for In to make choices in of new on the political stage, however, the of than to and and three elections with GERB and political parties such as the Bulgarian three elections challenged GERB's dominance but did not a with a of the of from in April to in 2021 with political elites and an electoral that politicians at their The April 2021 provided for the first with when of the vote for parties and with The rise of a by is such a was Despite a a clear political of the vote in April 2021. a key role in the turbulent political year that as a new to parties. soon became clear that their rise as a on the of Bulgarian politics a of success of in the Bulgarian political an especially to his as the of a on Bulgarian but his of politics a of politicians in and and and 2020). Democratic Bulgaria, Ivanov's electoral coalition ‘Da, Bulgaria’ for reform and the some from their successful political and to new protest with the also made it to the of these and the to a government with GERB, the of the April 2021 of the no government could be after first and a new one was for In 2021, GERB to become the with of the Yet populist to to engage in with other parties and to compromise on led to to a Ultimately, the 2021 parliamentary elections new the protest – the led by and had as ministers in a government the until a regular government could be and had with parts of and to key and of GERB and The two politicians an also from in to a provided new for the GERB on a of for in the third parliamentary of 2021, and with of the against for The for in these successive elections be as a of the trend of electoral explained by and as an and of democracy. the Bulgarian have been successive elites for to electoral and on a more on the increasing for pro-reform movements and parties, be they on a Democratic Bulgaria) or populist as a of the GERB model of politics and increasing and however, several to a Bulgaria's from the 2021 was the the and Democratic Bulgaria electoral coalition Bulgaria and the The choice of coalition was not only by the the political of and their to have against corruption that GERB and but also the that pro-Russian formation important with practices of political place was the of coalition which under the of took place in working was live for the The of the coalition were the of the in key policy Despite the for and the working group was in 2021, barely two months after the last that a government based on a coalition be was a only was an to the rather by the but coalition formation was with to and electoral rather than significant policy of government in its brief of office was the of an and and the European of that plan on April 2022. focusing on the the that the plan was and with for its and Commission President the that almost of the to facilitate the Bulgaria's the plan one of the to 2022). Indeed, with the to facilitate Bulgaria's the plan has the to and not only for and but also for Bulgarian security and from the other policy of the government that were early on were social policy such as of and institutional reforms such as a law specialized courts. were taken anti-corruption institutions such as the Commission for and of some in the of the its last former Prosecutor in Chief, was but the of a new and chairman was by one of the coalition parties and 2022). Despite these successful first the in which the coalition government was to in a normal way was very The coalition between recently Democratic Bulgaria) and the the Bulgarian political on key of domestic politics and foreign These were when Bulgaria was exposed to the of geopolitical change and the emerging – and – in between democracy and by the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. two months after the government took office in 2021, the Russian invasion in Ukraine brought divisions over geopolitical the the of the in Ukraine on the Bulgarian political has been very to its and public opinion by from the start of the the of the of and Russia's on the has been and 2022). Bulgarian most notably the were of or even with Russian through their Prime early of the of following for and of the Russian for the as was one of the with Russian influence This was in by the of Russian diplomats as one of the last and most significant policy of the government In from the government for with and of a were in the Bulgarian parliament and further the The with a pro-Russian were they not or to Ukraine. Democratic Bulgaria, which the pro-European ‘Da Bulgaria’ and parties, however, voted in of and for to Ukraine. Prime government took a Ukraine in the months following the Bulgarian to EU's and was by an rhetoric by the Russian Bulgaria a state with the other EU member states 2022). Despite Russian Bulgaria voted for the successive of by the EU and in one of the first two states to from to the to for in in with EU 2022). to the taken by the government was led by the President Rumen Radev, a political of and made a of in of the conflict as a between great rather than an invasion and a of law by from the party and especially its chairman in the to these tensions through Bulgarian politics and domestic political unfolded in the and summer of in the of that started in 2021. than following geopolitical along the the cleavage between politicians committed to institutions and those involved in politics democratic institutions. This the between governance to democratic and constitutional principles and informal governance with use of social media for decision and The both of political actors, rent were with and on the one and with on the other. In early leader via that was his from the government 2022). for the was that the government had managed public in an way and that the Prime had with European to Bulgaria's veto for the start of accession negotiations with North Macedonia 2022). Subsequently, on various accused the Prime of for for the with North Macedonia. In their Prime and that were the to to for dubious and to the to a political in the of public and 2022). vote of no against the government was by GERB a after his of from the The vote was on and was by GERB, former coalition and right formation the government Bulgarian 2022). After the the Prime and other government figures at the actions to corruption and checks at the between Bulgaria and as one of the main reasons for the actions of political to the This the role by informal, governance in Bulgarian actors their in government for influence and with business but organized to the foreign the main 2021 was Bulgaria's veto on North EU accession Bulgaria had been an of North Macedonia and other Western to 2019, enlargement a of its Presidency of the Council of Ministers in 2018 (Gotev, 2020). The country in 2020 from a of the accession of Western to the start of negotiations with North Macedonia. In October 2019 Bulgaria had a despite supporting the start of negotiations with the two to be by North Macedonia. of those were to of progress and of the Macedonia of 2019). other Bulgaria that North Macedonia on the which the both Bulgaria and to of from In the of former Bulgarian foreign Bulgarian rhetoric and of as the problems of the Bulgarian government (Gotev, 2020). it be that enlargement negotiations has been a of EU enlargement governance from the Enlargement at provides of a which have been in the or the by member where to of to the such as to the in the have been as they against the and of enlargement policy and to to the or and a a that a political to two very of has been The of the and on of the last make near to address from a and more likely to be by focusing on (Bechev, On both of the in Bulgaria and North Macedonia, are political actors by to the For example, the Bulgarian was by former Prime as a of the of his the – a coalition in third (Gotev, 2020). as their are a party that as a of an early for the of Macedonia from the rule. have been on to North Macedonia, more the of nationalist and right political 2021, in the of a regular Bulgaria was in and EU by President Radev, the on North Macedonia by the Council on which and The Bulgarian Socialist a former and coalition for has been with the President and (Bechev, some of the on against and in early that to the Bulgarian on North Macedonia be and taken in with the to opening the to Ukraine as a state and some progress with North Macedonia and the EU, through the President of the Commission Commissioner for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Varhelyi, and President Macron as the of the French Presidency of the took a Bulgaria under pressure and compromise Ultimately, in the Bulgarian with the French EU Presidency a proposal that some of Bulgaria's to the EU accession for the of a Bulgarian in North (Bechev, This proposal was to the Bulgarian at the same time as the vote of against the government led by in 2022. The of and to the French proposal of the Bulgarian provides further that the North Macedonia is to nationalist with the Bulgarian Socialist Party these for the of the part of the Bulgarian – more than – do not Bulgaria lifting its veto until is on the (Bechev, There are for North Macedonia is an to and Bulgaria's for – as it is for North Macedonia against the that for various political actors both in Bulgaria and North Macedonia it has been more to electoral by escalating the These the two parties the of Bulgaria's and North main This contribution has the for the complexity and of Bulgarian politics in 2021 and the first half of 2022. In contrast to the when the EU's pro-reform have domestic in the course of the last year the of EU politics have a of with politicization of relations with North Macedonia, has led to further Ultimately, electoral and the in 2021, the cleavages in made a government with the parliamentary At the time of it that for government the same parliament are not likely to and Bulgarian be to to the in the of 2022. The of to on further reforms in the domestic arena, of of the anti-corruption the and is for the time In their last in however, government and have the they have for and reforms in Bulgarian politics since the In the foreign policy arena, actions have led to as On the following the vote of no the Bulgarian parliament the main lines of compromise on North Macedonia contained in the French presidency was by GERB and while the Bulgarian Socialist Party and voted that domestic reform cleavages and foreign policy cleavages do not for the European Council of Bulgaria its in with the compromise to opening of negotiations with North Macedonia. no was made on with the government based on from the to Russian diplomats for For the EU, it is important to that most politicians and member states of Bulgarian or the of the with North Macedonia – and are not of in the Council have a for nationalist which could also in The same is of North Macedonia, as mass protests and in against the French proposal in On both of the pro-European politicians to nationalist that compromise and the for and democratic of both The of European has been to such in other parts of but such have to be in by elites the to to the of the rather than the of the (Bechev, to Bulgaria, the that and a from could in the to the of corrupt and or pro-Russian parties in the EU with an exposed Eastern in an that is of great to