Signalling, screening and costly misrepresentation
研究了当虚假陈述私人信息有成本且每种类型有不同自然最低成本信号时，多种信号对信号均衡和筛选结果的影响，发现福利损失消失且类型被精确识别，并解释了雇主为何偏好多轮面试。
Abstract When misrepresenting private information is costly and each type has a different “natural” least‐cost signal or message, the availability of multiple signals has a significant effect on signalling equilibria and on the set of implementable outcomes in a screening context. In particular, welfare losses associated with costly signalling disappear as the number of available signals increases, yet at the same time each type is identified with a high degree of precision in every equilibrium satisfying a dominance criterion. In the screening context, we establish conditions under which the principal can implement an arbitrary allocation profile at a small communication cost. This result helps to explain why employers often prefer to screen applicants via multiple interviews rather than via menus of contracts. We also derive an optimal screening mechanism in such a setting. A surprising property of this mechanism is the absence of exclusion.