When Should Bankruptcy Law Be Creditor‐ or Debtor‐Friendly? Theory and Evidence
研究债权人保护如何影响不同个人破产成本的企业，发现高成本企业在债务人友好制度下借贷和投资更多，低成本企业则在债权人友好制度下更多，并用韩国破产改革数据验证。
ABSTRACT We examine how creditor protection affects firms with different levels of owners' and managers' personal costs of bankruptcy (PCB). Theoretically, we show that firms with high PCB borrow and invest more under a more debtor‐friendly management stay system, whereas firms with low PCB borrow and invest more under a more creditor‐friendly receivership system. Intuitively, stronger creditor protection relaxes financial constraints but reduces credit demand. Which effect dominates depends on owners' and managers' PCB. Empirically, we find support for these predictions using a Korean bankruptcy reform that replaced receivership with management stay.