Regulation and Distrust
研究发现，各国政府监管力度与公众信任水平呈强负相关。模型解释为：不信任催生对监管的需求，而监管又抑制信任形成，导致多重均衡。低信任国家的民众即使知道政府腐败，仍希望更多干预。
We document that, in a cross section of countries, government regulation is strongly negatively correlated with measures of trust. In a simple model explaining this correlation, distrust creates public demand for regulation, whereas regulation in turn discourages formation of trust, leading to multiple equilibria. A key implication of the model is that individuals in low-trust countries want more government intervention even though they know the government is corrupt. We test this and other implications of the model using country- and individual-level data on trust and beliefs about the role of government, as well as on changes in beliefs during the transition from socialism.