Should developing countries ban dual practice by physicians? Analysis under mixed hospital competition
研究发展中国家医生同时在公立和私立医院工作的双重执业现象，通过博弈模型分析其对医院收益、医生服务量和社会福利的影响，发现双重执业总体上有利于社会福利，但医院间竞争激烈时可能降低双方收益。
Dual practice, where physicians work both in public and private hospitals, is a widely observed phenomenon, particularly in developing countries. This paper studies a multi-stage game where hospitals compete for physicians as well as patients and, the service provided by physicians endogenously depends on the competitive setting in which hospitals operate. Specifically, we examine the impact of allowing dual practice on hospital payoffs, physician's service and societal welfare. We find that dual practice is socially desirable, since it softens the competition for physician's exclusive service while also increasing the amount of their service. However, if the degree of competition between the hospitals is significant, dual practice may not yield the highest payoffs for both public and private hospitals.