实验决策与博弈中视觉显著性的可预测效应

Predictable Effects of Visual Salience in Experimental Decisions and Games

Quarterly Journal of Economics · 2022
被引 45
人大 A+FT50ABS 4*

中文导读

研究了自下而上的视觉显著性(即图像中吸引注意力的特征)如何影响经济决策,发现显著性会导致选择错误,并在合作与竞争博弈中影响行为,对行为产业组织、价格和税收显著性等有启示。

Abstract

Abstract Bottom-up stimulus-driven visual salience is largely automatic, effortless, and independent of a person’s “top-down” perceptual goals; it depends only on features of a visual stimulus. Algorithms have been carefully trained to predict stimulus-driven salience values for each pixel in any image. The economic question we address is whether these salience values help explain economic decisions. Our first experimental analysis shows that when people pick between sets of fruits that have artificially induced value, predicted salience (which is uncorrelated with value by design) leads to mistakes. Our second analysis uses evidence from games in which choices are locations in images. When players are trying to cooperatively match locations, predicted salience is highly correlated with the success of matching (r = .57). In competitive hider-seeker location games, players choose salient locations more often than predicted by the unique Nash equilibrium. This tendency creates a disequilibrium “seeker’s advantage” (seekers win more often than predicted in equilibrium). The result can be explained by level-k models in which predicted stimulus-driven salience influences level-0 choices and thereby influences overall perceptions, beliefs, and choices of higher-level players. The third analysis shows that there is an effect of visual salience in matrix games, but it is small and statistically weak. Applications to behavioral IO, price and tax salience, nudges and design, and visually influenced beliefs are suggested.

视觉显著性实验决策博弈论层级模型