Relational Contracts and Development
综述了关系契约（基于未来互动价值的非正式安排）在发展中国家和国际市场中的证据，探讨其作为企业与市场之外的治理形式，并介绍测量方法和政策启示。
This article reviews an emerging body of evidence on relational contracts, defined as informal arrangements sustained by the value of future interactions. We focus on developing and international markets, which are often characterized as contexts with weak formal contract enforcement. We introduce relational contracting between firms as a governance form alternative to both firms and markets. We then review evidence on the prevalence of long-term relationships between firms and discuss why this governance form might be particularly common in developing countries. After introducing a simple framework, we discuss the measurement of relational contracting between firms. We review an approach that takes dynamic incentive compatibility constraints to the data to quantify the value of future interactions and illustrate how different types of shocks can be used to uncover the inner functioning of relational contracting. We also review structural models and conclude with policy implications and promising avenues for future research.