On the relation between corruption and market competition
构建了一个模型，其中官僚可能受贿以误导当局，发现腐败增加了竞争企业数量，而竞争加剧又提高了腐败的可能性和贿赂金额，两者互为因果。
Abstract We construct a model where bureaucrats are corruptible, in the sense that they may accept bribes in order to mislead the authorities on the actual circumstances of firms that do not comply with a government regulation. We show that corruption increases the number of competing firms. We also show that increased competition (i) increases the likelihood that corruptible bureaucrats will actually transgress, and (ii) increases the bribe that corrupt bureaucrats will demand from each firm. These results are consistent with existing evidence showing a positive relation between competition and corruption, and that this causal relation operates in both directions.