Regulating Commission-Based Financial Advice: Evidence from a Natural Experiment
利用以色列2013年政策变化这一自然实验，研究发现限制金融顾问佣金显著降低了共同基金费用率并增加了资金流入，价格敏感型基金流入增幅达35%。
Abstract Do limitations on commissions paid to financial advisers reduce prices of financial products and stimulate investment? I examine these questions by estimating the causal effects of regulating commissions for mutual fund distribution. I exploit the unique institutional setting in Israel and the 2013 policy change when the government reduced commissions differently for different fund types. The reform led to a major decline in fund expense ratios and a consequent increase in fund flows. Funds with price-sensitive investors experienced 35% larger inflows. I interpret these results as investor responses to price competition fostered by a reduction in distribution costs.