How Do Board Reforms Affect Debt Financing Costs Around the World?
研究了全球董事会改革对债务融资成本的影响，发现改革后贷款利差上升，且对股东-债权人冲突敏感的企业影响更大，但审计委员会独立性改革有助于降低成本。
Abstract In this study, we examine the effect of worldwide board reforms on the cost of debt financing. We document an increase of loan spread after a country initiates the reform. The increase is larger among firms that are more exposed to shareholder–debtholder conflicts. The results suggest that board reforms empower shareholders at the cost of debtholders. However, we also find that, while the reform component related to board independence leads to the increase in the cost of debt, the component related to audit committee independence helps decrease the cost.