Training, Recruitment, and Outplacement as Endogenous Adverse Selection
构建了一个竞争性劳动力市场模型，其中工人拥有企业特定和通用技能，企业选择披露何种信息。研究发现，提供通用培训、招聘和再就业支持是相互关联的，通过披露不良匹配的通用人力资本信息而隐瞒良好匹配的信息，可以实现工人有效配置并产生逆向选择，使工人能够为通用培训付费，且被解雇工人的工资可能高于留任者。
This paper presents a model of a competitive labour market where workers vary in firm‐specific and general skills, and firms choose the kind of information to disclose. We show that provision of general training, recruitment, and outplacement are linked. Disclosing general human capital information on bad matches but revealing nothing about good matches (information disclosure that resembles outplacement support in professional service firms) leads to an efficient allocation of workers and creates adverse selection that enables workers to pay for general training. It also implies that wages of released workers can be higher than wages of those who are retained.