Cheaper by the bundle: The interaction of frictions and option exercise in variable annuities
研究了可变年金产品中，将基础合同与可选保障打包的设计如何因市场摩擦（尤其是税收规则）影响投保人行为，从而降低提供商的复制价值。
Abstract Typical Variable Annuity products combine complex baseline contracts at substantial fees with optional guarantees. We argue this product design aligns with the benefits of bundling to the provider, to the extent that the baseline option features can reduce total replication value. This is possible due to market frictions, and particularly taxation rules, affecting policyholder exercise behavior. We demonstrate the relevance of this mechanism in the context of popular withdrawal guarantees, both theoretically and empirically. Specifically, we show that in the presence of personal taxes, adding on a common death benefit at baseline may decrease the total contract value to the provider.