Assignment feedback in school choice mechanisms
通过实验研究在延迟接受、顶层循环和波士顿三种择校机制中，偏好报告期间提供实时分配反馈对均衡分配和真实报告的影响，发现反馈能增加均衡分配但未提高真实报告。
Abstract This paper experimentally investigates the provision of real-time feedback about school assignments during the preference reporting period in three widely employed mechanisms: deferred acceptance, top trading cycles, and the Boston mechanism. Adaptive models predict that greater sensitivity to tentative assignments during the reporting period will produce more equilibrium assignments in all three mechanisms. Consistent with adaptive predictions, real-time assignment feedback consistently increased equilibrium assignments but did not increase truthful reporting. These findings suggest that providing feedback about assignments during the preference reporting period could help student assignment mechanisms more reliably achieve policy goals.