Between Commonweal and Competition
利用企业间联盟理论，比较了公私合作伙伴关系（PPP）与企业间联盟在治理上的差异，发现PPP更倾向于使用不完整合同、限制活动范围和非股权抵押，而信任机制作用有限。
The authors leverage insights and theories from the extensive interfirm (business-to-business, or B2B) alliance literature to explore the effect of the sectors of the partners on the governance of infrastructure public–private partnerships (PPPs) as compared with B2B alliances. Their analysis suggests that the sectors of the partners have an important impact on PPP governance, not only because the sector constrains the availability of some governance mechanisms but also because it makes alternative mechanisms available or relevant to the partners. Specifically, the authors predict that PPPs will avoid equity structures and will rely, instead, on less complete and more complex alliance contracts; a restricted scope of activities; and nonequity hostages, such as metagovernance mechanisms or stakeholder involvement. Contrasting with B2B alliances, their analysis also suggests that trust-based governance mechanisms will play a minimal role in the governance of PPPs.