Equity Issuance Methods and Dilution
分析了知情股东策略性认购时配股与公开发行的优劣，发现配股在无财富约束时最优，但财富受限股东会面临更大稀释，企业选择发行方法时存在投资效率与财富转移的权衡。
Abstract We analyze rights and public offerings when informed shareholders strategically choose to subscribe. Absent wealth constraints, rights offerings achieve the full information outcome and dominate public offerings. When some shareholders are wealth constrained, rights offerings lead to more dilution of their stakes and lower payoffs, despite the income from selling these rights. In both rights and public offerings, there is a trade-off between investment efficiency and wealth transfers among shareholders. When firms can choose the flotation method, either all firms choose the same offer method or high and low types opt for rights offerings, while intermediate types select public offerings.