Talent Discovery and Poaching Under Asymmetric Information
构建了一个知识工作者市场模型，其中人才在工作中被发现，信息不对称和企业特定人力资本导致高质量企业更可能挖角，低质量企业更可能投资人才发现，且跳槽存在逆向选择。
Abstract We develop a model of the market for knowledge workers in which talent is discovered on the job. In the model, asymmetric information and firm-specific human capital combine to generate several predictions relating firm heterogeneity to talent discovery and poaching. We show that high-quality (i.e., large and high-productivity) firms are more likely to become talent poachers, while lower-quality firms are more likely to invest in talent discovery. Job-to-job flows are adversely selected, which implies that internally promoted managers are more productive than those who are externally promoted. The model generates several additional predictions linking firm heterogeneity to the distribution of managerial talent, productivity, compensation and promotions.