Co‐opetition strategies in supply chains with strategic customers
研究一个生产关键零部件的制造商与原始设备制造商之间的竞合策略，分析顾客耐心和对手产品质量如何影响制造商是否向对手供货或自己进入终端市场，并探讨新顾客、成本差异和第三方供应商的影响。
We study the co‐opetition strategy between a manufacturer of a proprietary component (MPC) and an original equipment manufacturer (OEM). The MPC can choose to supply components to the OEM and can also compete in the end market with its own final product. Customers can purchase from either firm and are strategic in that they choose whether to buy now or later. In a two‐period game theoretical model, we analyze the MPC's optimal co‐opetition strategy, which mainly concerns whether to sell to the OEM or to enter the end market. The optimal strategy can be characterized by the customer's patience to wait and the competitor's product quality. We then extend our model to investigate three key factors: new customers arriving late, cost differentiation between the two firms, and the existence of a third‐party supplier. While in the first two extensions the optimal strategies remain qualitatively the same as in the main model, the existence of a third‐party supplier impacts the MPC's choice of co‐opetition strategy crucially. We discuss how the MPC should balance cooperation and competition, and characterize the conditions when the MPC should change strategy.