A Quantitative Model of Dynamic Moral Hazard
构建了一个包含道德风险的均衡模型，其中部分生产率冲击仅被企业管理者私下观测到。模型估计不可观测冲击相对温和，占企业产出总变动的约10%，但道德风险导致的激励薪酬占管理者薪酬的50%，消除道德风险可使总产出增加约1%。
Abstract We develop an equilibrium model with moral hazard, which arises because some productivity shocks are privately observed by firm managers only. We characterize the optimal contract and its implications for firm size, growth, and managerial pay-performance sensitivity and exploit them to quantify the severity of the moral hazard problem. Our estimation suggests that unobservable shocks are relatively modest and account for about 10$\%$ of the total variation of firm output. Nonetheless, moral-hazard-induced incentive pay is quantitatively significant and accounts for 50$\%$ of managerial compensation. Eliminating moral hazard would result in about a 1$\%$ increase in aggregate output.