Welfare Effects of Changing Technological Efficency in Regulated Open-Access Fisheries
研究了在受监管的开放准入渔业中，捕捞效率提高如何影响消费者剩余和生产者剩余，发现只有当初始效率低到未出现最大可持续产量过度捕捞时，效率提升才会增加福利。
Abstract Small-scale fisheries often operate under conditions of regulated open access; that is, the fishery is subject to natural or regulatory constraints on fishing technology, including regulations of fishing gear and fishing practices, but typically there is no direct regulation of catches. We study how an increase in harvesting efficiency changes the different components of welfare—consumer surplus and producer surplus—in such a regulated open-access fishery, taking t the feedback of harvesting on stock dynamics, i.e. the dynamic common-pool resource externality into account. We find that both components of welfare change in the same direction. If, and only if, initial efficiency is low enough so that there is no maximum sustainable yield (MSY) overfishing, an improvement of harvesting efficiency increases welfare.