Appointed learning for the common good: Optimal committee size and monetary transfers
研究在不确定性下，同质个体通过投票委托委员会决策时，如何通过委员会规模和货币转移设计，实现高或最优水平的信息获取，并发现委员会规模需小但不可为一人。
A population of identical individuals must choose one of two alternatives under uncertainty about the state of the world. Individuals can acquire different levels of costly information and complete contracts are not feasible. For such a setup, we investigate how vote delegation to a committee and suitable monetary transfers for its members can ensure that high or optimal levels of information are (jointly) acquired. We show that for a (stable) committee that uses the majority rule to maximize the probability of choosing the right alternative and then to minimize aggregate information acquisition costs, its size must be small in absolute terms (if full learning is possible) and small relative to population size (if only partial learning is possible). Yet committees must never be made up of one member, so the tyranny of a single decision-maker can be avoided. Our analysis identifies both the potential and some of the limitations of monetary transfers in committee design.