Competition on Agricultural Markets and Quality of Smallholder Supply: The Role of Relational Contracting and Input Provision by Traders
研究了在缺乏第三方合约执行和不完全投入市场的背景下，贸易商的市场势力如何通过关系契约影响小农户的作物质量投资，并利用埃塞俄比亚小麦市场的实证数据验证了理论预测。
We analyze how market power by traders on local agricultural spot markets affects investment in crop quality by smallholders in a context with “imperfect institutions”—without third-party contract enforcement and with incomplete input markets. Farmers and traders can engage in relational contracting where the promise of future rents supports current cooperation. We analyze informal contracting under the shadow of side selling by the farmer and ask how changes in the competitiveness of local markets affect flows of inputs in relational contracts. When local markets become more competitive, fewer farmers are included in relational contracting with traders, and farmers who remain in such relationships receive less support from traders. We document empirical evidence from local wheat markets in Ethiopia that is consistent with the theory.