Lender Trust and Bank Loan Contracts
研究了贷款方CEO祖籍国的平均信任水平如何影响美国银团贷款利率，发现信任度高的银行收取更低利率，并通过提升借款人信息可信度和缓解合同问题来降低信贷成本。
We examine the contractual implications of a lender’s trust for corporate loans. We measure how trusting a lender is using the average trust attitude in the chief executive officer’s ancestral country of origin. We find that banks with trusting CEOs charge lower interest rates in U.S. syndicated loans. This effect is identified within existing lender–borrower relationships and similar types of loans. Further analyses indicate that trust reduces the cost of credit by boosting the perceived credibility of borrower information and by mitigating contracting problems. We corroborate our findings by conducting a survey of loan officers with experience in loan syndication. This paper was accepted by Gustavo Manso, finance. Supplemental Material: The internet appendix and data are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4371 .