Efficiency and equity of input subsidies: Experimental evidence from Tanzania
通过坦桑尼亚的实地实验，比较抽签和当地委员会两种方式选择补贴受益者，发现抽签导致私人化肥被替代和二级市场出现，而委员会方式未出现精英俘获，但补贴对农业产出和福利影响有限。
Abstract Input subsidy programs (ISP) often have two conflicting targeting goals: selecting individuals with the highest marginal return to inputs on efficiency grounds, or the poorest individuals on equity grounds, allowing for a secondary market to restore efficiency gains. To study this targeting dilemma, we implement a field experiment where beneficiaries of an ISP were selected via a lottery or a local committee. In lottery villages, we find evidence of displacement of private fertilizer and of a secondary market as beneficiaries are more likely to sell inputs to non‐beneficiaries. In contrast, in non‐lottery villages we find no evidence of displacement nor of elite capture. The impacts of the ISP on agricultural productivity and welfare are limited, suggesting that resources should be directed at complementary investments, such as improving soil quality and irrigation.