Advising the Management: A Theory of Shareholder Engagement
研究了股东与管理层沟通意见的有效性，发现股东信念分歧会导致股东基础受限，而被动基金能改善参与效果，偏好不一致时参与决策变为替代关系。
Abstract We study the effectiveness of shareholder engagement, that is, shareholders communicating their views to management. When shareholders and management have different beliefs, each shareholder engages more effectively when other shareholders engage as well. A limited shareholder base can thus prevent effective engagement. However, a limited shareholder base naturally arises under heterogeneous beliefs because investors who most disagree with management do not become shareholders. Passive funds, which own the firm regardless of their beliefs, can counteract these effects and improve engagement. When shareholders’ and management’s preferences are strongly misaligned, shareholders’ engagement decisions become substitutes and the role of ownership structure declines. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.