CDS Trading Initiation, Information Asymmetry, and Dividend Payout
研究了信用违约互换（CDS）交易启动如何影响公司股利支付政策，发现CDS启动后公司增加股利以缓解因银行监督减弱而加剧的经理与股东之间的代理冲突。
This study uses an information-asymmetry framework to examine the effect of initiation of credit default swaps (CDS) trading on firm dividend payout policy. We find evidence that CDS initiation is associated with increasing dividends, which is consistent with firms distributing excess free cash flow to mitigate exacerbated manager-equityholder agency conflicts resulting from reduced monitoring by banks following CDS initiation. Additional findings support this explanation by showing that the dividend increases are concentrated among borrowing firms with higher agency cost before CDS initiation, among firms whose lead arranger banks have a relatively less strong reputation in the loan-syndication market, and among firms whose loans are subject to less intense monitoring features—that is, less restrictive loan covenants—following CDS initiation. Additional analyses also suggest that inferences are robust to controlling for the potential effects of CDS initiation on capital structure. This paper was accepted by Brain Bushee, accounting. Funding: Financial support from the Goizueta Business School, the Kenan-Flagler Business School, and the Business School UNSW Sydney is gratefully acknowledged. Supplemental Material: The data and internet appendix are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4337 .