Managerial Myopia, Earnings Guidance, and Investment*
研究管理者通过盈利预测的准确性传递项目质量信号，导致投资扭曲：盈利超预期时过度投资、未达预期时投资不足，并发现预测偏悲观可缓解短视管理者的投资不足问题。
ABSTRACT This study investigates the real effects of management communication, specifically of forecasts or earnings guidance , on investment. Managers can signal the strength of their projects through accuracy in their earnings guidance. This leads less accurate managers to distort their investments; the equilibrium investment strategy involves over‐investment when earnings exceed the forecast and under‐investment when earnings fall short. Moreover, we find that managers are pessimistic in their forecasts, which helps to explain the corresponding well‐documented empirical regularity. This downward bias increases the likelihood of investment manipulation but decreases the real loss from distortion. Interestingly, the over‐investment induced by earnings guidance helps to mitigate the classic under‐investment problem for a myopic manager with unobservable investment. Earnings guidance can therefore be value‐increasing when managerial myopia is severe.