Surety bonds and moral hazard in banking
研究了一种要求银行所有者除股权资本外还提供担保债券的政策，该债券资金由监管机构投资，银行存续期间投资者获得收益，破产时用于偿付负债，并证明仅靠资本要求无法解决存款保险引发的道德风险。
We examine a policy in which owners of banks provide funds in the form of a surety bond in addition to equity capital. This policy would require banks to provide the regulator with funds that could be invested in marketable securities. Investors in the bank receive the income from the surety bond as long as the bank is in business. The capital value could be used by bank regulators to pay off the banks’ liabilities in case of bank failure. After paying depositors, investors would receive the remaining funds, if any. Analytically, this instrument is a way of creating charter value but, as opposed to Keeley (1990) and Hellman, Murdock and Stiglitz (2000), restrictions on competition are not necessary to generate positive rents. We demonstrate that capital requirements alone cannot prevent the moral hazard problem arising from deposit insurance.