Reconciling Relational Contracting and Hold-up: A Model of Repeated Negotiations
指出博弈论中关系契约分析常用的帕累托最优均衡会排除随机博弈中直观的敲竹杠问题，提出基于重复谈判的均衡选择概念，并通过例子展示其如何自然结合关系契约与敲竹杠担忧。
Abstract Game-theoretic analysis of relational contracts typically studies Pareto optimal equilibria. We illustrate how this equilibrium selection rules out very intuitive hold-up concerns in stochastic games with long-term decisions. The key problem is that Pareto optimal equilibria, even if satisfying renegotiation-proofness, do not reflect plausible concerns about how today’s actions affect future bargaining positions within the relationship. We propose and characterize an alternative equilibrium selection based on the notion that continuation play is repeatedly negotiated in a relationship. We illustrate with several examples how the concept naturally combines relational contracting and hold-up concerns.