Field Disasters, Routine Shifts, and Adaptation Performance: Evidence from the Chernobyl disaster
研究了切尔诺贝利灾难后全球核电站人为操作偏差反而增加的现象，提出这是组织为适应更高安全标准而改变偏差归因常规的表现，对理解组织适应绩效有启示。
Following a field disaster, organizations must be able to adapt to complicated new requirements like improved safety standards by changing their existing routines. Post-disaster, fewer deviations attributed to internal factors are expected and seen as evidence of adaptation. Using a difference-in-differences approach with data on nuclear power plants (NPPs) in 33 countries from 1976 to 2004, this study finds that, contrary to expectations, operational deviations attributed to human factors at NPPs increased globally for a long period after the Chernobyl disaster. This study argues that this counterintuitive performance is a manifestation of adaptive routines. To adapt to the environmental requirements for heightened safety standards, organizations may tend to alter their routines for attributing deviation causes by facilitating and transparently reporting the classification of more deviation causes as internal factors. These arguments extend organizational adaptation theory by suggesting that explicit performance does not necessarily manifest as adaptive routines because of the potential conflict between explicit and implicit performance dimensions in the context of complicated adaptation goals.