A novel approach for quantitative importance analysis of safety DI&C systems in the nuclear field
针对核安全仪表控制系统数字化带来的组件交互复杂和故障信息难获取问题，提出一种基于STAMP模型和权重分配的新方法，无需故障信息即可定量分析组件重要性，并通过实例和真实系统验证。
As the digitalization of the safety instrumentation and control (I&C) systems in the nuclear field causes very complex interactions between their components and difficulty in securing quantitative failure information of each component, there are considerable challenges in analyzing them via probabilistic safety assessment (PSA), the typical safety analysis framework of existing safety I&C systems. This study proposes a new approach to resolve these challenges. The suggested method develops a system model based on the systems-theoretic accident model and processes (STAMP) philosophy and assigns weights to specific components according to design information and operation strategies instead of quantitative failure information. Based on the assigned weights, the importance of each component is derived by calculating the effect of a single component failure on the overall I&C functions. The methodology is explained through simple examples and validated with an analysis of a real-world system. The proposed approach is expected to be useful in deriving insights from the design stages to the improvement stages for more diverse I&C systems by enabling quantitative importance analysis without failure information.