Separating Ownership and Information
发现所有权与控制权的分离虽然常被视为效率损失的根源，但由此导致的所有权与信息分离，反而有助于在控制权市场中通过内部与外部股东间的策略沟通，引出外部竞标者的私有信息，从而促进有效交易。
This paper identifies an upside of the separation of ownership and control, typically the source of inefficiencies in the theory of the firm. Because insiders obtain private information by exercising control, the separation of ownership and control leads to a separation of ownership and information. We show that this separation is necessary for efficient trade in the market for corporate control. The analysis reveals how strategic communication between inside and outside shareholders facilitates takeovers by eliciting external bidders’ private information. Our results call into question mandatory disclosure requirements during takeovers.