Dispersed Behavior and Perceptions in Assortative Societies
构建了一个社会互动与错误推断模型，假设个体忽视社会中的分类性，错误地认为他们与人口的代表性样本互动。研究发现，分类性忽视与策略互补性结合会加剧社会中的行为分散（如教育投资的社会经济差距），并有助于理解收入不平等感知偏差和政治态度极化。
We formulate a model of social interactions and misinferences by agents who neglect assortativity in their society, mistakenly believing that they interact with a representative sample of the population. A key component of our approach is the interplay between this bias and agents’ strategic incentives. We highlight a mechanism through which assortativity neglect, combined with strategic complementarities in agents’ behavior, drives up action dispersion in society (e.g., socioeconomic disparities in education investment). We also suggest that the combination of assortativity neglect and strategic incentives may be relevant in understanding empirically documented misperceptions of income inequality and political attitude polarization.