Debt Overhang and Lack of Lender's Commitment
区分了两种债务积压模型，指出贷款人缺乏承诺导致的效率损失可通过债务减免实现帕累托改进，但摩擦性讨价还价可能使债务积压持续。
Abstract The debt overhang of sovereigns or firms is modeled in the recent literature as a constrained efficient outcome of dynamic debt contracts under the lack of the borrower's commitment, where debt relief is not Pareto‐improving. The early literature observes another type of debt overhang where the borrower is discouraged from expending effort, anticipating the lender to take all output ex post . We show that this inefficiency is due to the lack of the lender's commitment and debt relief is Pareto‐improving. Nevertheless, debt overhang may persist, as frictional bargaining over debt relief can take a long time.