Firm‐Level Climate Change Risk and CEO Equity Incentives
研究发现，面临更高气候变化风险的企业会给予CEO更高的股权激励，且这种激励在长期能降低股权资本成本、提升企业估值。
Abstract We document evidence that CEOs who lead firms that face higher climate change risk (CCR) receive higher equity‐based compensation. Our finding is consistent with the compensating wedge differential theory and survives numerous robustness and endogeneity tests. The result is more prominent for firms that are socially responsible, susceptible to higher environmental litigation and part of the non‐high‐tech industries. Furthermore, we find supportive evidence that firms offering higher equity incentives to their CEOs for managing higher CCR are usually better off in the long run via a lower cost of equity capital and higher firm valuation.