Managerial Entrenchment and the Market for Talent
研究了管理层技能性质如何影响公司治理决策，发现当所需技能从企业专用转向通用时，股东更倾向于用外部人选替换表现不佳的CEO，因此公司会加强治理以限制现任CEO的固守并利用人才市场机会。
Abstract This paper studies how the nature of managerial skills affects firms’ governance decisions. As required skills shift from firm specific toward more general abilities, replacing an underperforming CEO with an outside hire becomes more profitable for shareholders. Therefore, firms adopt stronger governance arrangements to limit the entrenchment of incumbent CEOs and exploit the improved opportunities offered by the market for talent. The analysis rationalizes the observed trend toward stronger corporate governance and offers novel empirical predictions concerning the relationship between managerial entrenchment, firm size, and the nature of managerial skills. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.