SETTLING LAWSUITS WITH PIRATES
研究企业如何通过与盗版者达成和解协议（包括现金支付和未来使用许可）来实施价格歧视，并分析这种策略对市场扩张或限制的影响。
Abstract A firm licenses a product to overlapping generations of heterogeneous consumers. Consumers may purchase the product, pirate/steal it, or forego it. Higher consumer types enjoy higher gross benefits and are caught stealing at a higher rate. The firm may commit to an out‐of‐court settlement policy that is “soft” on pirates, so high types purchase the product and low types steal it until caught. Settlement contracts, which include both cash payments and licenses for future product use, facilitate price discrimination. Settlement may either create social value by expanding the market or destroy value by limiting market access and possibly deterring more efficient entrants.