Cross-Subsidization in Conglomerate Firms: Evidence from Government Spending Shocks
利用联邦政府支出变化带来的需求冲击，研究企业组织结构如何影响投资行为，发现联合企业内存在交叉补贴，且这种补贴会降低运营绩效并增加多元化折价。
Abstract Exploiting demand shocks from changes in federal government spending, we examine how the organizational structure of a firm affects its investment behavior. Government spending shocks affect the investment of government-dependent conglomerate segments less than matched stand-alone firms. Investment also increases in lower government-dependent segments when other segments within the same firm experience positive demand shocks, indicating cross-subsidization between segments. We further show that this cross-subsidization leads to worse operating performance and increases the diversification discount. Our findings are robust after addressing the endogeneity of government spending.