Relationship Lending and Employment Decisions in Firms’ Bad Times
利用企业层面调查数据，研究发现与银行关系持久的企业在面临负面销售冲击时，其就业增长对冲击的敏感性显著降低，尤其当冲击是暂时性的时。这为年轻、小型企业及调整成本高的行业提供了流动性保险，支持劳动力囤积。
Abstract Using firm-level survey information, we investigate whether relationship lending affects firms’ employment decisions in the face of negative sales shock. We find that firms with a durable relationship with their main bank display significantly less employment growth sensitivity to such shocks, especially where these are transitory. The result is stronger for younger and smaller firms that benefit from tighter bank-firm relationships, and for firms in sectors or economic environments where the costs of employment adjustment are greater. Our findings indicate that relationship lending provides liquidity insurance to firms to meet their demand for labor hoarding.