Negation of Sanctions: The Personal Effect of Political Contributions
研究发现，政治捐款能减少欺诈高管面临的民事和刑事制裁，这种效应在欺诈使公司受益、高管身处弱董事会或向有权势政客捐款时更强，最终损害股东价值。
Abstract We show that political contributions are associated with reduced civil and criminal sanctions for fraudulent executives. These managers benefit more from contributions if their firm also gained from the fraud, if they occupy top positions in firms with weak boards, or if they contribute to powerful politicians. Political contributions reduce budgetary resources for government enforcers and lengthen the Securities and Exchange Commission’s case time-to-resolution. They also facilitate penalty transfer from fraudulent managers to the firm, resulting in their entrenchment and long-term destruction of shareholder value. Our findings highlight an agency cost of political contributions and a mechanism undermining the disciplining effect of regulations.