The Value of Mandatory Certification: A Real Effects Perspective
研究了强制认证相比强制披露在提升投资效率方面的额外价值，发现强制披露而不强制认证可能降低效率，为监管机构（如SEC）考虑增加披露要求但未配套认证措施提供了警示。
ABSTRACT We study the real effects of certification to demonstrate the value of mandatory certification over and above mandatory disclosure in enhancing investment efficiency. In our model, a firm's manager selects a project to maximize the firm's short‐term stock price, which is a function of her certification and disclosure decisions about the outcome of the project. Although the manager might be either forthcoming or strategic with regard to the disclosure of her private information, she can strategically choose whether to incur a cost or not to certify her disclosure, unless mandated. The manager always selects the first‐best project when both certification and disclosure are mandatory. However, when certification is voluntary, project selection is inefficient. In addition, mandating disclosure without mandating certification can lead to lower investment efficiency than mandating neither. In justifying why mandatory certification is beneficial for public firms, our results offer a note of caution regarding the contemplated regulatory moves for increased disclosures by public firms without corresponding certification requirements, for example, the recent SEC proposal requiring extensive climate‐related disclosure.