From Market Making to Matchmaking: Does Bank Regulation Harm Market Liquidity?
研究发现，危机后银行监管虽提高了做市成本，但通过促使银行转向撮合业务、加剧非银行竞争，反而降低了平均交易成本并改善了投资者福利。
Abstract Postcrisis bank regulations raised market-making costs for bank-affiliated dealers. We show that this can, somewhat surprisingly, improve overall investor welfare and reduce average transaction costs despite the increased cost of immediacy. Bank dealers in OTC markets optimize between two parallel trading mechanisms: market making and matchmaking. Bank regulations that increase market-making costs change the market structure by intensifying competitive pressure from nonbank dealers and incentivizing bank dealers to shift their business activities toward matchmaking. Thus, postcrisis bank regulations have the (unintended) benefit of replacing costly bank balance sheets with a more efficient form of financial intermediation.