Perpetuating Crisis as a Supply Strategy: The Role of (Nativist) Populist Governments in EU Policymaking on Refugee Distribution
研究了民粹主义政府与主流政府在欧盟理事会决策中的差异，发现民粹主义政府会拒绝不利于己的规则、拒绝妥协手段，并利用僵局证明欧盟的软弱，即使政策通过对其有利。
Abstract We still know very little of how populist governments behave as compared to mainstream governments in Council decision‐making. Studying the ‘crucial case’ of negotiations around refugee distribution in the EU, an issue which allows populists to mobilize both anti‐EU and anti‐immigrant sentiment, we demonstrate that populist governments differ from mainstream ones in three important ways: First, they reject formal and informal rules of Council decision‐making if these are not conducive to their preferred outcome; second, they reject traditional means of ensuring compromise such as package‐deals and side‐payments; third, they reject the final solution and exploit the ensuing deadlock to prove that the EU is weak and dysfunctional. We show that populist governments adopt such a behaviour even when they would benefit from the adoption of a policy solution. However, we expect populists to engage in such political games only when the negative effects of non‐decisions are not immediate.