Commitment and discretion in contracts: theory and evidence from retirement plans*
研究企业如何通过关系合同激励员工，发现当员工面临离职冲击时，承诺问题导致效率与分配的权衡，关系合同在特定条件下利润可超过正式合同，并用退休金计划数据验证了预测。
Abstract We consider a firm's problem of incentivizing its workforce through relational contracts, when workers effectively face a shorter time horizon due to possible separation shocks. Commitment issues then generate a trade‐off between efficiency and distribution, which affects both performance and profits. Profits under relational contracting can exceed those under formal contracting, despite lower performance, when discounting is moderate, firm bargaining power is weak, and shocks are likely. Using a matched employer–retirement plan dataset, and interpreting discretionary profit‐sharing plans and employee stock ownership plans as relational and formal contracting, respectively, we find some support for our predictions.