Governance and leverage: International evidence
利用跨国董事会改革作为自然实验，研究发现改革使企业杠杆率平均提高1个百分点，需大幅调整董事会的企业杠杆率提高5个百分点，且弱股东权利国家中效果更显著。
Abstract In this study, we use board reforms across countries as a natural experiment to examine the effect of governance on firm leverage. We find that board reforms are associated with a statistically significant 1‐percentage‐point increase in leverage overall and a 5‐percentage‐point increase on average for firms that had to make large board changes. These results are robust to a variety of specifications and to controls for potential confounding events. The increase in leverage is also larger for firms in weak shareholder rights countries, suggesting that other shareholder rights can substitute in part for board reforms.