Teams and individuals in standard auction formats: decisions and emotions
通过实验室实验，比较了个人与团队在第一价格、第二价格和英式拍卖中的投标行为，发现团队在部分拍卖中更理性，情绪对投标的影响在个人与团队间无差异。
Abstract Our study compares individual and team bidding in standard auction formats: first-price, second-price and ascending-price (English) auctions with independent private values. In a laboratory experiment, we find that individuals overbid more than teams in first-price auctions and deviate more from bidding their own value in second-price auctions. However, we observe no difference in bidding behavior in English auctions. Based on control variables, we provide evidence that the observed difference could be explained by better reasoning abilities of teams. Emotions seem to play a role in determining bids, but the effect of emotions on bidding does not differ between individuals and teams.