Stability of strict equilibria in best experienced payoff dynamics: Simple formulas and applications
研究了最佳体验收益动态下严格纳什均衡的稳定性，提供了判断稳定性的简单公式和算法，对理解博弈学习过程有用。
We consider a family of population game dynamics known as Best Experienced Payoff Dynamics. Under these dynamics, when agents are given the opportunity to revise their strategy, they test some of their possible strategies a fixed number of times. Crucially, each strategy is tested against a new randomly drawn set of opponents. The revising agent then chooses the strategy whose total payoff was highest in the test, breaking ties according to a given tie-breaking rule. Strict Nash equilibria are rest points of these dynamics, but need not be stable. We provide some simple formulas and algorithms to determine the stability or instability of strict Nash equilibria.